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Since China’s WTO accession it has been involved in four WTO disputes 
relating to financial services as the respondent, while other WTO Members 
remain concerned that China continues to limit access to foreign financial 
services and service suppliers. As other WTO Members’ concerns could be
either realistic or overcritical, this paper aims to explore whether there are any 
further inconsistencies in China’s GATS obligations and financial regualtions. 
After reviewing all WTO Members’ concerns on China’s financial services, this 
paper examines the consistency of four frequently and constantly raised issues 
with the GATS agreement and China’s WTO obligations. As a result, this paper 
finds that two regulations are inconsistent with Article XVI and Article XVII of 
the GATS: the 20 per cent cap on shareholding in a Chinese-funded bank by a 
single foreign financial institution, and the 1 million RMB minimum for foreign 
banks’ local currency business. Further, China still has not complied with its 
transparency obligations under the Accession Protocol and Working Party 
Report. These findings are significant for the Chinese government as well as 
other WTO Members who already have or want to have close trade relations 
with China in financial services.  
I INTRODUCTION
Since China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, other Members 
have been paying serious attention to China’s compliance with the General 
Agreement on Trade of Services (GATS) because of China’s great 
participation in services trade. While China is well-known for products made 
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in China, it is also one of the top traders in world commercial services. In 
2011, 10 years after China’s WTO accession, China’s gross imports and 
exports of services rose from USD 66 billion to 362.4 billion at an annual 
growth rate of 20.4%.1 Among the top economies,2 in 2015 China’s services 
trade shared 6% of world total export and 10.11% of the import market, which 
was only slightly lower than the United States but higher than all other
countries. 3 However, despite these positive aspects of China’s WTO 
accession, concerns have been raised about China’s compliance on trade in
financial services immediately after its WTO accession, and to this day.4
A series of GATS-related disputes against China and issues continuously 
presented by other Members illustrate tensions regarding China’s GATS 
obligations and its compliance. So far in 2017, China has been involved in six 
GATS disputes as the respondent, four of which are related to financial 
services. Other Members alleged that China’s measures at issue5 or its actions6
were inconsistent with its obligations under Articles XVI and XVII of the 
GATS. In addition to these disputes, other WTO Members remain concerned 
that China continues to limit access to foreign services and service suppliers in 
some Chinese service sectors, frustrated the efforts of foreign service suppliers 
to achieve anywhere near their full market potential.
Many questions have been raised concerning trade in services under the 
Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) and the Trade Policy Review (TPR).
Among all service sectors, China’s financial services have been most 
frequently questioned by other Members under both the TRM and TPR. Under 
the TRM, Members have brought forward comments and questions about 
financial services in a separate document to the specific Committee on Trade 
in Financial Services, instead of a document to the Council for Trade in 
Services.7
                                                                 
1 During the period 2000–2010, ‘China’s Statistics of Trade in Services 2011’ Data group, 
source: The WTO’s International Trade Statistics Database, data released by the Ministry of 
Commerce, PR China.
2 Top 12 economies including the United States, China, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, 
France, Brazil, Italy, India, Russian Federation, Canada, and Australia, according to the World 
Bank Gross Domestic Product 2014.
3 Data from World Trade Organization, Statistic Database.
The United States: 14.52% (export) and 10.17% (import); Japan: 3.32% (export) and 3.77% 
(import); Brazil: 0.69% (export) and 1.49% (import); India: 3.27% (export) and 2.65% 
(import); Russia: 1.07% (export) and 1.88% (import); Canada: 1.60% (export) and 2.07% 
(import); Australia: 1.02% (export) and 1.16% (import); the European Union (EU): 25.19% 
(export) and 19.74% (export). Even though the share of EU is much higher than China, the 
data of the EU is not comparable with China as a community of states.
4 See below, after the first ten years of China’s WTO accession, other Members raised concerns
about China’s trade in services under the Transitional Review Mechanism, and continue to 
query trade in services under the Trade Policy Review.
5China—Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information 
Suppliers, Dispute DS378, DS373 and DS372.
6 China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, Dispute DS413.
7 For example, in 2002, the European Union put forward comments and questioned on TRM 
China trade in services in the WTO document (Restricted S/C/W/211), in which the European 
Union clearly stated: ‘Please refer to the comments and questions sent on insurance, banking 
and securities services to the Committee on Trade in Financial Services’ (S/FIN/W/18).
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Figure A: Number of Members Raising Concerns 
(by Service Sector)
Although China has replied to other Members’ concerns under the TRM and 
TPR, this does not mean that these responses eliminate the possibility of 
GATS-inconsistency and are acceptable to the other Members. However, not 
all issues posed are considered GATS-inconsistencies because other Members 
may have unrealistic expectations of achieving full market potential in China. 
These issues could be valid or overcritical, but they trigger consideration of 
one question—apart from the issues deriving from the former GATS disputes 
against China, are there any further inconsistencies in China’s GATS 
obligations and relevant domestic measures in financial services?
An examination of the TRM and TPR with respect to China’s financial 
services reveals four issues that have been frequently and constantly raised by 
other Members. These issues could be summarised as: limitations on foreign 
investment in China-funded financial services; conditions on branches of 
foreign banks with respect to engaging in local currency business; and China’s 
transparency obligations. As these oft-cited issues have not resulted in WTO 
disputes or been addressed by the Chinese government, this research will 
examine whether or not these issues are consistent with China’s WTO 
obligations. 
II LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Under the TRM and TPR, the European Community, the United States, 
Australia, Japan and Mexico consider that Articles 8 and 9 of the Measures for 
the Administration of Investment and Shareholding in Chinese-funded 
Financial Institutions by Foreign Financial Institutions (hereinafter the 
Measures)8 establishes foreign ownership restrictions in the banking sector. 
This issue has been questioned 15 times under the TRM and 14 times under 
                                                                 
8 ຳཆ䠁㶽ᵪᶴᣅ䍴ޕ㛑ѝ䍴䠁㶽ᵪᶴ㇑⨶࣎⌅, Order of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission No. 6 [2003], promulgated on 8 December 2003. 
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the TPR but at the time of writing had neither been claimed for a WTO dispute 
nor revised by the Chinese government.
Article 8 of the Measures regulates the percentage of shares that an individual 
foreign financial institution can own in a Chinese-funded financial institution, 
which cannot exceed 20%. Article 9 does not directly regulate the maximum 
percentage of shares that can be owned, but states that a non-listed Chinese-
funded financial institution must be supervised and administrated as a foreign 
financial institution if multiple foreign financial institutions own more than 
25% of its shares. In other words, over 25% of collectively foreign equity 
investment classifies a non-listed Chinese financial institution in the Chinese 
stock exchange as a foreign financial institution. Other Members consider that 
the percentage caps of foreign shares in Chinese-funded financial institutions 
are inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations, because China committed to 
ensuring that qualified foreign financial institutions would be permitted to 
establish Chinese–foreign joint banks and did not schedule any limitations on 
the percentage of foreign ownership in these banks.
The Chinese government’s response to these regulations and practices was that 
there were no violation of the commitments in the Schedule because: (1) the 
issue of foreign equity participation in China’s domestic banks was, by nature, 
an issue of cross-border merger and acquisitions, which was beyond the scope 
of China’s WTO accession commitments;9 (2) the 25% threshold was not a 
cap on foreign shares, but only a criterion to determine the nature of a 
financial institution (whether a Chinese bank or a joint venture bank);10 and 
(3) the qualification of an enterprise as a joint venture was that foreign equity 
participation should be no less than 25% (the proportion of foreign investment 
in an equity joint venture shall be no less than 25% of the registered capital of 
the joint venture, the horizontal commitments in the Schedule). 11 China’s 
responses reveal that the controversy derives from the identification of the 
nature of foreign equity participation in Chinese-funded banks. China 
considers the 20% and 25% foreign share values as percentage caps on foreign 
investment, while concerned Members regard them as market access 
limitations on Chinese–foreign joint venture banks in terms of the maximum 
percentage of foreign shareholding.
To verify the GATS-consistency of this issue, it is necessary to first clarify 
foreign investment in Chinese-funded banks and Chinese–foreign joint venture 
banks, by refining the terms used for Chinese-funded banks, joint venture 
banks and the relationship between foreign investment and trade in services. 
                                                                 
9 Committee on Trade in Financial Services, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 27 November 2006,
Note by the Secretariat’ Restricted S/FIN/M/53 30 November 2006, hereinafter China’s 
Responses 2006, at [28].
10 Committee on Trade in Financial Services, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 12 November 
2007 Note by the Secretariat’ Restricted S/FIN/M/55, 16 November 2007, hereinafter China’s 
Responses 2007, at [44].
11 Committee on Trade in Financial Services, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 1 December 2008 
Note by the Secretariat’ Restricted S/FIN/M/57, 4 December 2008, hereinafter China’s 
Responses 2008, at [32].
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This paper then discusses whether the 20% and 25% caps on foreign shares on 
Chinese-funded banks are consistent with China’s GATS commitments.
A Context
Under the 2014 TPR, the United States asked China what in practice it meant
to regulate a bank as a foreign-funded institution and how did this differ from 
being regulated as a Chinese financial institution. China answered that 
‘separate regulation on foreign-funded banks in practice is for the 
consideration of classified regulation … and banking regulators implement 
differentiated regulation on various institutions according their 
characteristics’, and ‘China formulated some special provisions on the 
regulation of foreign-funded banks by referring to best international practices 
and mature experience of other countries according to the characteristics of 
foreign-funded banks for the consideration of prudential regulation’.12
Regarding Chinese-funded commercial banks, Article 2 of the Measures
emphasises that Chinese-funded financial institutions/commercial banks are 
established within China according to law. Laws relating to the establishment 
of Chinese-funded commercial banks include the Commercial Bank Law of 
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Commercial Bank Law)13 and the 
Measures of China Banking Regulatory Commission for the Implementation of 
Administrative Licensing Matters Concerning Chinese-funded Commercial 
Banks (hereinafter the Measures Concerning Chinese-funded Commercial 
Banks).14
The Commercial Bank Law is the fundamental law regulating all commercial 
banks that are established to absorb public deposits, make loans, arrange 
settlement of accounts and engage in other business in accordance with this 
law and the Company Law of People’s Republic of China. The Measures
Concerning Chinese-funded Commercial Banks state that Chinese-funded 
commercial banks include large state-controlled commercial banks (referred to 
as state-owned commercial banks),15 the Postal Saving Bank of China,16 joint-
                                                                 
12 Trade Policy Review Body 1 and 3 July 2014, Trade Policy Review China Minutes of 
Meeting Addendum, WT/TPR/M/300/Add.1, 9 September 2014, 192.
13ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ୶ъ䬦㹼⌅, adopted at the 13th Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Eighth National People’s Congress on 10 May 1995, and revised on 27 December 2003 for 
the first time, and revised on 25 August 2015 for the second time by the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress. 
14 ѝഭ䬦ⴁՊѝ䍴୶ъ䬦㹼㹼᭯䇨ਟһ亩ᇎᯭ࣎⌅ , Order of China Bank Regulatory 
Commission No. 2 [2006], was revised by Order of CBRC No. 1 [2013] on 15 October 2013 
for the first time and revised by Order of CBRC No. 2 [2015] on 5 June 2015.
15 See general, state-owned commercial banks include Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China Limited (ICBCѝഭᐕ୶䬦㹼), Agricultural Bank of China Limited (ABCѝഭߌъ
䬦㹼), Bank of China Limited (ѝഭ䬦㹼), China Construction Bank (CCB ѝഭᔪ䇮䬦㹼), 
Bank of Communication (Ӕ䙊䬦㹼). All are listed banks on the Shanghai Stock Market. 
16 See general, China Post Group owned by the State is the only shareholder of the Postal 
Saving Bank, but the situation will change because the Postal Saving Bank started a USD 8 
billion IPO process in Hong Kong on August 2016.  
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stock commercial banks17 and urban commercial banks.18 Moreover, Article 
11 of the Measures Concerning Chinese-funded Commercial Banks has
regulations echoing the 20% and 25% caps: the proportion of the shares of a 
single foreign financial institution as the promoter or strategic investor of a 
Chinese-funded commercial bank cannot be more than 20%, and the total 
shares of several foreign financial institutions as the promoters or strategic 
investors cannot be more than 25%.
Foreign banks have shares in China’s state-owned commercial banks, such as 
GIC Private Limited owns 0.07% of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China; the Standard Chartered Bank owns 0.37% of the Agricultural Bank of 
China; the Bank of Tokyo–Mitsubishi UFJ Limited owns 0.18% of the Bank 
of China; and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 
(100% owned by HSBC Holdings plc) owns 18.7% of the Bank of 
Communication. Among 12 joint-stock commercial banks, three have foreign 
financial institutions as the majority shareholders: Hua Xia Bank (Deutsche 
Bank Luxembourg SA, 9.28%; Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 8.21%), 
China Bo Hai Bank (Standard Chartered Bank [Hong Kong] Limited, 19.99%) 
and Evergrowing Bank (United Overseas Bank, 12.4%). 
Moreover, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria had a 5% shareholding in China 
CITIC Bank valued at 5.01 billion Hong Kong dollars (HKD) until 2013 when 
it sold all its stocks for 13.136 billion HKD; and Citigroup Inc. had a 20% 
shareholding in China Guangfa Bank, but sold all its stocks to China Life 
Insurance Company in 2016.19 With respect to urban commercial banks, the 
shareholders of most are Chinese financial institutions, companies, enterprises 
and local governments. 
A small number have foreign financial institutions as shareholders, such as the 
Beijing Bank (ING Bank NV, 13.64%), Tianjin Bank (Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group, 12.03%), Shengjing Bank (VMS Investment Group, 
4.63%), Shanghai Bank (BancoSantader SA, 7.20%), Ningbo Bank 
(Overseas–Chinese Banking Corporation, 20%), Nanjing Bank (BNP Paripas, 
3.69%), Xi’an Bank (Scotiabank Globe, 19.99%) and Qi Lu Bank 
(Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 20%). Even though foreign financial
institutions can be shareholders of state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock 
                                                                 
17 See general, 12 joint-stock commercial banks until 2016, including China Merchant Bank Co. 
Limited (CMB ᤋ୶䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ), Shanghai Pudong Develop Bank Co. Limited 
(SPDB к⎧⎖ьਁኅ䬦㹼), China CITIC Bank Co. Limited (CITICѝؑ䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜ
ਨ), Hua Xia Bank Co. Limited (HXB ॾ༿䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ), China Everbright Bank Co. 
Limited (CEB ѝഭݹབྷ䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ), China Minsheng Banking Corporation (CMBC 
ѝഭ≁⭏䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ), Industrial Bank Co. Limited (IB ޤъ䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ), 
China Guangfa Bank Co. Limited (CGB ѝഭᒯਁ䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ), Ping An Bank Co. 
Limited (PAB ᒣᆹ䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ), China Zheshang Bank Co. Limited (CZB ⎉୶䬦㹼
㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ ), China Bo Hai Bank Co. Limited (CBB ⑔⎧䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ ), 
Evergrowing Bank Co. Limited (EB ᚂѠ䬦㹼㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ).
18See general, there were 132 urban commercial banks until 2016, <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/
chinese/jrjg/index.html>.
19 See general, all data in this paragraph is updated to 30 June 2016.
2017 CHINA’S FINANCIAL REGULATIONS … 145
 
commercial banks and urban commercial banks, in practice they do not have 
more than a 20% shareholding.
In relation to foreign-funded banks, the State Council of China promulgated 
the Regulation on the Administration of Foreign-funded Banks (hereinafter the 
Regulation)20 and the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulation 
on the Administration of Foreign-funded Banks (hereinafter the Rules for 
Implementation) 21 regulating wholly foreign-owned banks, joint venture 
banks, branches and representatives of foreign banks. Article 2 of the 
Regulation defines a Chinese–foreign joint venture bank as established by a 
foreign financial institution and a Chinese company or enterprise. The 
Regulation establishes conditions, procedures and capital requirements for the 
establishment of joint venture banks, but does not mention the ratio of 
investment from foreign financial institutions. 
Until 2016, there were 46 foreign-funded banks.22 In practice, most foreign-
funded banks prefer to establish branches and wholly foreign-owned banks in 
China. For example, some former joint venture banks have reclassified to the 
Chinese-funded commercial bank (Xiamen International Bank) or wholly 
foreign-owned bank (International Bank of Paris & Shanghai). Only a small 
number of Chinese–foreign joint venture banks are still running, with 
examples being the SPD Silicon Valley Bank established by Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank and Silicon Valley Bank with 50% shareholdings each; 
Hua Yi Bank established by Fubon Financial Holding Co. Limited (80%) and 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (20%); and Sino–German Bausparkasse 
established by China Construction Bank (75%) and Bausparkasse 
Schwaebisch Hall AG (25%). The minimum shareholding for foreign financial 
institutions in joint venture banks is 25%, as indicated in the horizontal 
commitments in the Schedule. Further, the minimum 25% requirement for 
foreign investment is also regulated in Article 4 of the Law on Chinese–
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures.23
A comparison of Chinese-funded commercial banks with Chinese–foreign 
joint venture banks with respect to the relevant laws and regulations 
mentioned above is presented in Table 1 over the page.
                                                                 
20ཆ䍴䬦㹼㇑⨶ᶑֻ, Order No. 478 of the State Council, promulgated and came into force on 
11 November 2006, and was revised by the Decision of the State Council on Amending Some 
Administrative Regulations on 29 July 2014, Order No. 653 of the State Council. 
21ཆ䍴䬦㹼㇑⨶ᶑֻᇎᯭ㓶ࡉ, Order of the China Bank Regulatory Commission No. 6 [2006] 
issued on 24 November 2006, amended by Order of the China Bank Regulatory Commission 
No. 7 [2015] on 1 July 2015. 
22 China Bank Regulatory Commission, <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/jrjg/index.html>.
23 ѝཆਸ䍴㓿㩕Աъ⌅, Order No. 48 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, 
adopted by the 5th National People’s Congress on 1 July 1979, amended by the National 
People’s Congress on 4 April 1990, and amended for the second time by the National 
People’s Congress on 15 March 2001. 
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Table 1: Chinese-funded Banks and Chinese–Foreign Joint Venture Banks
B 25% Shareholdings
Article 9 of the Measures states that a non-listed Chinese-funded financial 
institution must be supervised and administrated as a foreign financial 
institution if multiple foreign financial institutions own more than 25% of its 
shares, but this limitation does not apply to listed Chinese-funded financial 
institutions. As indicated above, four state-owned commercial banks with 
foreign financial institutions as shareholders are Chinese-funded banks listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange; and three joint-stock commercial banks have 
foreign financial institutions as shareholders, one of which (Hua Xia Bank) is 
a listed bank. The 25% cap does not apply to these listed banks, and they are 
still Chinese-funded banks if a foreign financial institution owns more than 
25% of the shares.
Non-listed Chinese-funded banks are still Chinese-funded banks if the 
aggregate foreign participation is less than 25%, but they must be supervised 
and administrated as a foreign financial institution if foreign participation is 
more than 25%. Other WTO Members are concerned that the regulation is 
inconsistent with China’s GATS commitment that within five years after 
accession, any existing non-prudential measures restricting ownership and 
juridical forms of foreign financial institutions will be eliminated. However, 
the Chinese government stated under the 2008 TPR that if foreign investors 
wish to raise their shares in a non-listed Chinese bank to above 25%, this will 
Bank type Similarity Difference 
Chinese-funded 
bank
* Established within China
* According to the same law 
(Commercial Bank Law and 
Corporate Law)
* Chinese judicial person
* Requirements for foreign 
shareholders or investors:
(a) their total assets must be no 
less than 10 billion USD at the 
end of the year prior to the filing 
of the establishment application
(b) their capital adequacy ratio 
must reach the average level at 
the place of its registration and 
the regulation of CBR.
* Administrative licensing 
procedure
* Maximum shareholdings 
for foreign financial institute-
ions: 25% by law and 20% in practice
* Certain types of bank: state-controll-
ed bank, the Postal Saving Bank, joint-
stock bank, urban bank
* Foreign promoter or investor
must have been rated as ‘good’ 
for its long-term credit in the previous 
2 years by an international rating instit-
ution acknowledged by the CBRC, 
and have retained a favourable balance 
in the previous 2 accounting years. 
Chinese–foreign 
joint venture bank
 
 
 
 
 
* Applying the Regulation 
* Shareholdings of foreign 
financial institutions: at least 
25% (in practice), but less 
than 100% (by law)
* Subject to approval by the 
Chinese government
* The unique or major foreign share-
holder must be a commercial bank 
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be regarded as the establishment of a new joint venture and the transaction 
will be subject to the approval of the CBRC, according to the Regulation and 
its Rules for Implementation. 24 This is consistent with China’s horizontal 
commitment that 25% is a threshold for the participation of foreign equity in 
Chinese–foreign joint ventures. The criterion for determining whether an 
enterprise qualifies as a joint venture is that foreign equity participation is no 
less than 25%.
In practice and according to domestic regulations, multiple foreign financial 
institutions have the right to any level of participation. When the proportion of 
foreign ownership is lower than 25%, it is still a Chinese-funded bank; when 
this proportion is 25–100%, it is a Chinese–foreign joint venture bank; and, 
when it is 100%, it is a wholly foreign-owned bank. Besides, rather than 
forbidding more than 25% foreign investment, Article 9 clearly states that 
such an organisation must be supervised and administrated as a foreign 
financial institution (Chinese–foreign joint venture bank). Therefore, the 25% 
cap on investment by multiple foreign financial institutions does not violate 
China’s commitment to eliminating restrictions on ownership.
Other WTO Members have also expressed concern about what it means to be 
regulated as a foreign-funded institution in practice, and whether this differs
from being regulated as a Chinese financial institution. If the difference leads 
to less favourable treatment for foreign investors, the 25% cap may be 
inconsistent with China’s national treatment obligations. Table 1 shows that 
China’s regulatory measures for domestic and foreign-invested banks do differ 
somewhat. The most significant difference is that the key or major foreign 
shareholder25 of a joint venture bank must be a commercial bank,26 but any 
foreign financial institution can be the promoter and investor of a Chinese-
funded bank. However, the Chinese government underscores that it is 
necessary ‘to implement different prudential measures to foreign-invested 
banks, according to the types of risks they face, to safeguard the interests of 
                                                                 
24 Trade Policy Review Body, 21 and 23 May 2008, Trade Policy Review China, Minutes of 
Meeting Addendum, WT/TPR/M/199/Add.1 28 August 2008, 250. 
25 See general, Article 4 of the Detail Rules for the Implementation of the Regulation on the 
Administration of Foreign-funded Banks, which interprets the term of key shareholder as a
commercial bank, which holds 50% or more of the total capital or total shares of the Chinese-
foreign equity joint bank to be established, or which does not hold 50% or more of the total 
capital or total shares of the Chinese-foreign equity joint bank to be established but is to 
have:
1. half or more of the voting rights of the Chinese–foreign equity joint bank to be  
established;
2. the power to control the financial and operating policies of the Chinese–foreign     
equity joint bank to be established;
3. the power to appoint and dismiss most of the members of the board of directors  or 
any similar power institution of the Chinese–foreign equity joint bank; and
4. half or more of the voting rights in the board of directors or similar power  
institution of the Chinese–foreign equity joint bank to be established.
In this sense, even though the foreign investor cannot hold 50% or more of the total capital, 
it can still be the key shareholder and must be a commercial bank. For example, as listed 
above, Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited has 19.99% of China Bo Hai Bank,
Scotiabank Globe has 19.99% of Xi’an Bank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia has 20% of 
Qi Lu Bank, and these foreign banks are the biggest shareholder. 
26 Article 11 of the Regulation on the Administration of Foreign-funded Banks.
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Chinese depositors and maintain the stability of the domestic financial 
system’.27 The Schedule clearly states that ‘within five years after accession, 
any existing non-prudential measures … shall be eliminated’. The Chinese 
government may persist with the requirement that being a commercial bank is 
a prudential measure to foreign-funded banks by providing reasonable 
elucidation. In this case, the requirement for being a commercial bank may not 
be inconsistent with China’s commitments as it is not a non-prudential 
measure. The partition of prudential and non-prudential measures on financial 
services is discussed later.
C 20% Shareholdings
Article 8 of the Measures demonstrably regulates that the proportion of the 
investment or shareholding in a Chinese-funded financial institution by a 
single foreign financial institution can be no more than 20%. Unlike Article 9, 
having over 20% of shares being held by a single foreign financial institution 
is not sufficient to change a Chinese-funded bank to a foreign-funded bank, 
but it is strictly forbidden by domestic regulations.
Article XVI:2(f) of the GATS states that limitations on the participation of 
foreign capital, in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding 
or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment, shall not 
maintain or adopt based on either a regional subdivision or its entire territory, 
unless otherwise specified in a Member’s schedule. Limitations within the 
meaning of Article XVI:2(f) should take one of two forms: (1) a maximum 
percentage of capital that can be held by foreign investors; or (2) a total value 
of foreign investment, either by an individual investor or foreign investors as a 
whole.28
Four elements of Article XVI:2(f) must be interpreted to determine whether 
the challenged measure is inconsistent with Article XVI: first, whether the 
challenged measure contains limitations on ‘foreign shareholding or the total 
value of individual or aggregate foreign investment’; second, whether the 
limitation is in terms of ‘a maximum percentage’; third, whether there are 
limitations on the services covered by a committed sector or subsector; and 
finally, whether the limitation is listed as an exception to market access in the 
Schedule.
1 Foreign Shareholding or Individual or Aggregate Foreign 
Investment
Article 8 of the Measures literally states that it is about investment or 
shareholding in a Chinese-funded financial institution by a single foreign 
financial institution; thus, this measure is addressed to impose limitations on 
foreign shareholding and individual foreign investment.
                                                                 
27 Trade Policy Review Body, 31 May and 2 June 2008, Trade Policy Review China Minutes 
of Meeting Addendum, WT/TPR/M/230/Add.1 22 February 2011, at 132. 
28 China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audio-visual Entertainment Products Report of the Panel, WT/DS/363/R 
12 August 2009, at [7.1360].
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2 A Maximum Percentage
The 2001 Scheduling Guidelines29 provides examples of limitations to market 
access drawn from schedules of specific commitments. For Article XVI:2(f), it 
enumerates as ‘foreign equity ceiling of x per cent for a particular form of 
commercial presence’, 30 and clarifies that ‘numerical ceilings should be 
expressed in defined quantities in either absolute numbers or percentages’.31
The words used in Article 8 are that ‘no more than 20 per cent’, which 
establishes a ceiling for foreign investment in Chinese-funded banks. The 
enforcement of the regulations prohibits foreign shareholding or investment 
over 20%. In doing so, it enacts a maximum limitation in terms of the 
percentage of participation of foreign capital.
3 Covered by a Committed Subsector
Even though the Measures regulate financial institutions, the terms of 
Chinese-funded financial institution include Chinese-funded banks; other 
WTO Members’ concerns focus on banking services but not the other 
financial institutions. In the Schedule, China has committed to subsector 
‘banking and other financial services’. The measure seems to be covered by 
the committed subsector of banking services. However, China claims that it 
did not make commitments with respect to the acquisition of domestic banks 
by foreign financial institutions.32
As a preliminary issue, China needs to clarify whether the Schedule includes 
specific commitments with respect to acquisition notwithstanding the fact that 
the word ‘acquisition’ does not appear in the Schedule. Article XX:3 of the 
GATS provides that WTO Members’ schedules shall be annexed to the GATS 
and shall form an integral part thereof, which means ‘the task of identifying 
the meaning of a concession in a GATS schedule is like the task of 
interpreting any other treaty text’.33 Further, Article 3.2 of the DSU rules that 
Members’ schedules must be interpreted according to the ‘customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’, which is well-stated in Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 34 , 35 Therefore, commitments in the 
Schedule must be interpreted like any other treaty text according to the rules 
codified in Article 31 and, to the extent appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna 
                                                                 
29 Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), S/L/92 28 March 2001.
30 Ibid [12]. 
31 Ibid [9].
32 China’s Responses 2006, above n 9, at [28]. ‘However, the issue of foreign equity 
participation in China’s domestic banks was, by nature, an issue of cross-border merger and 
acquisitions (M&A), which was beyond the scope of China’s WTO accession commitments, 
and therefore irrelevant for the TRM’.
33 United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005, at [160].
34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, and entered into 
force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331. China’s accession of 
Vienna Convention was on 3 September 1997. 
35 China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services Report of the Panel 
WT/DS413/R, 16 July 2012, at [7.8].
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Convention. Pursuant to Article 31, the Schedule must be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms when 
read in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the GATS and 
the WTO agreements.36
This paper will start by examining the ordinary meaning of key terms. As 
dictionary definitions are generally not conclusive, it will have to examine the 
context of the Schedule, which includes the W/120,37 the remainder of the
Schedule, the provisions of covered agreements other than the GATS, the 
substantive provisions of the GATS and schedules of other Members. 38
Pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, it will also refer to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the history of negotiations, 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31.39
Regarding the ordinary meaning of acquisition, the definition in the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary reads as follows: ‘an asset or object bought or 
obtained, a purchase of one company by another’. The ordinary meaning of 
acquisition does not appear to connect with trade in services. Reading 
acquisition in the context of the Schedule, W/120 and its cross-references, the 
CPC40 has been used as a tool for interpretation because W/120 is part of the 
negotiating history of the GATS and is normally used by Members in the 
preparation of their GATS schedules. Examining the immediate context of the 
Schedule shows that China followed the W/120 structure in the Schedule, and 
made reference to CPC codes. Looking beyond the GATS to other covered 
agreements, Article 22.3(f) of the DSU provides a reference that confirms the 
relevance of W/120 to the task of identifying service sectors in Members’ 
schedules.41 Unfortunately, the context provided by the Schedule indicates that 
the acquisition is not a service subsector under W/120 and CPC. Thus, the 
main argument around this issue should not relate to deciding whether China 
has made commitments on the acquisition, but to deciding whether the 
measure is a pure activity of investment or overlaps with providing banking 
services in the mode of commercial presence (Mode 3).
As a supplementary means of interpretation, commercial presence clearly 
covers foreign investment of services, as discussed above. Moreover, Article 
XXVIII of the GATS clearly connects acquisition and trade in services by 
defining commercial presence as any type of business or professional 
establishment including through (i) the constitution, acquisition or 
maintenance of a juridical person; or (ii) the creation or maintenance of a 
branch or a representative office within the territory of a Member for the 
purpose of supplying a service. Thus, the measure limiting foreign investment 
                                                                 
36 United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, Report of the Panel, WT/DS285/R, 10 November 2004, at [6.46].
37 Services Sectoral Classification List, note by Secretariat, 10 July 1991, MTN. GNS/W/120, 
hereinafter W/120. 
38 Report of the Appellate Body, US—Gambling, above n 33, at [178].
39 Report of the Panel, US—Gambling, above n 36, at [6.48].
40 Central Product Classification, submitted to the United Nations Statistical Commission, 
DRAFT ESA/STAT/SER.M/77/Ver.1.1, 5–8 March 2002, hereinafter CPC. 
41 Report of the Appellate Body, US—Gambling, above n 33, at [181].
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on Chinese-funded banks is covered by China’s commitments to banking 
services provided by the mode of commercial presence.
4 Specified in a Member’s Schedule
In 7.B, Banking Services and Other Financial Services of the Schedule, China 
lists three types of exception—geographic coverage, clients and licensing—for 
Mode 3 in the limitations on market access column. However, none of these 
exceptions refer to the maximum percentage limitation on foreign 
shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.
Based on the above analysis, Article 8 of the Measures setting up the 20% cap 
on investing in a Chinese-funded bank by a single foreign financial institution 
falls within the scope of individual foreign investment; enacts a maximum 
limitation in terms of the percentage participation of foreign capital; is covered 
by banking services providing in Mode 3; and was not carved out in the
Schedule as a limitation on market access. Therefore, Article 8 of the 
Measures contains a limitation on the foreign equity participation in terms of a 
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding under Article XVI:2(f) of 
the GATS, and is contrary to China’s commitments in its schedule.
In terms of this potential inconsistency, China argued that ‘the stipulations are 
related to the need of prudential supervision provided for in the Annex under 
the GATS, the implementation of which is for the purpose of protection of 
investors, depositors and ensuring the integrity and stability of the financial 
system’.42 As China’s banking sector is still under-developed and the effects 
of the international financial crisis are still being felt, China has every reason 
to be cautious regarding further liberalisation of the subsector.43 The Annex 
clearly states that a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for 
prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy 
holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service 
supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. 
However, the Annex also emphasises that where such measures do not 
conform to the provisions of the GATS, they shall not be used as a means of 
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations. 
III CONDITIONS ON LOCAL CURRENCY BUSINESS
Regarding local currency business, China has listed geographic restrictions, 
client limitations and licensing qualifications in the market access column, and 
national treatment as the exception in its GATS obligations. Although the 
restrictions and limitations were indeed removed after 11 December 2006, 
WTO Members in 2005 began querying the situation around engaging in local 
currency business by branches of foreign banks. Four Members expressed 
concern about the issue of local currency business under the TRM, including 
                                                                 
42 Trade Policy Review, above n 27, 238. 
43 Ibid. 
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Japan (2005, 2007, 2008),44 the United States (2006, 2007, 2008),45 Canada 
(2007)46 and the European Communities (2007, 2008, 2009, 2011),47 and four 
Members made inquiries under the TPR, including the European Communities 
(2006),48 Japan (2008),49 Mexico (2008)50 and Australia (2012).51
Table 2: Commitments to Local Currency Business in China’s Schedule
Sector and 
subsector 
Limitations on market access Limitations on 
national treatment
7. B. Banking and 
Other Financial 
Services
(excluding insurance
and securities)
Banking services as 
listed below:
(a) acceptance of 
deposits and other 
repayable funds from 
the public
(b) lending of all types, 
including consumer 
credit, mortgage credit, 
factoring and financing 
of commercial 
transaction
(c) financial leasing
(d) all payment and 
money transmission 
services, including 
credit, charge and debit 
cards, travellers’
cheques and bankers’
drafts (including import 
and export settlement)
(e) guarantees and 
commitments
(f) trading for own 
account or for account 
of customers: foreign 
exchange.
(3)
A. Geographic Coverage
For local currency business, the 
geographic restriction will be phased out 
as follows: … Within 5 years after 
accession, all geographic restrictions 
will be removed.
B. Clients
For local currency business, within 2 
years after accession, foreign financial 
institutions will be permitted to provide 
services to Chinese enterprises.
Within 5 years after accession, foreign 
financial institutions will be permitted to 
provide services to all Chinese clients.
Foreign financial institutions licensed 
for local currency business in one region 
of China may service clients in any 
other region that has been opened for 
such business.
C. Licensing
Qualifications for foreign financial 
institutions to engage in local currency 
business are as follows:
– 3 years of business operation in 
China and being profitable for 2 
consecutive years prior to the 
application, otherwise, none. 
(3)
Except for geographic 
restrictions and client 
limitations on local 
currency business 
(listed in the market 
access column), a 
foreign financial 
institution may do 
business without 
restrictions or the need 
for case-by-case 
approval, with foreign-
invested enterprises, 
non-Chinese natural 
persons, Chinese 
natural persons and 
Chinese enterprises. 
Otherwise, none.
                                                                 
44 Committee on Trade in Financial Services, Communication from Japan, Restricted 
S/FIN/W/58 10 October 2007, at [7]; S/FIN/W/64 10 November 2008, at [7].
45 Committee on Trade in Financial Services, Communication from the United States, Restricted 
S/FIN/W/61 29 October 2007, at [12]; S/FIN/W/68 27 November 2008, at [9].
46 Committee on Trade in Financial Services, Communication from Canada, Restricted 
S/FIN/W/62 30 October 2007, at [4].
47Committee on Trade in Financial Services, Communication from European Communities, 
Restricted S/FIN/W59 22 October 2007, at [8]; S/FIN/W/66 14 November 2008, at [4]; 
S/FIN/W/70 12 October 2009, at [5]; S/FIN/W/81 13 October 2011, at [7].
48 Trade Policy Review Body, 19 and 21 April 2006, Trade Policy Review People’s Republic     
of China Minutes of Meeting Addendum, WT/TPR/M/161/Add.1, 15 June 2006, 143.
49 Trade Policy Review China Minutes of Meeting Addendum, WT/TPR/M/199/
Add.1, above n 28, 121.
50 Ibid 254. 
51 Trade Policy Review China Record of the Meeting Addendum, above n 56, 29.
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A 1 Million RMB Requirement for Accepting Deposits from 
Chinese Citizens
Article 31 of the Regulation states that branches of foreign banks in China 
may only accept retail deposits from Chinese citizens in excess of 1 million 
RMB. Regarding the 1 million RMB requirement, the United States claimed 
that this would be inconsistent with the Schedule after December 2006 as 
China committed to eliminate national treatment and market access limitations 
relating to geographical, client and scope of business factors within five years 
of its WTO accession. The GATS-consistency assessment with respect to the 
banking services at issue can be conducted in two steps, to determine whether 
China has undertaken commitments and whether China has fulfilled those 
commitments.
1 Whether China has Undertaken Commitments
The Schedule includes banking services of acceptance of deposits and other 
repayable funds from the public, so that foreign bank branches engaging in 
local currency business is one of banking services committed by China. The 
banking services of concern are provided through a bank branch (Mode 3 the 
commercial presence) in the territory of China.
With respect to limitations on market access under Mode 3, China made the 
commitment that within five years after accession, foreign financial 
institutions would be permitted to provide services to all Chinese clients. The 
issue at hand seems to be inconsistent with conditions agreed and specified in 
the Schedule, because all limitations were eliminated after five years of 
China’s accession. However, the list of measures under Article XVI:2 is 
exhaustive 52 and the type of clients receiving foreign services is not covered 
by the second paragraph of Article XVI:2. Thus, the relevant issue does not 
fall under Article XVI.
With respect to limitations to national treatment under Mode 3, China 
committed to ‘none’ except for geographic restrictions and client limitations 
on local currency business (listed in the market access column); it also made 
the commitment that foreign financial institutions could do business without 
restrictions or the need for case-by-case approval with foreign-invested 
enterprises, non-Chinese natural persons, Chinese natural persons and Chinese 
enterprises. The term ‘none’ is a GATS scheduling convention that means ‘no 
limitations’—in other words, a full commitment.53 The words ‘none except’ 
indicate that a Member intends to make a full commitment subject only to the 
                                                                 
52 See general, the first four sub-paragraphs concern quantitative limitations on service suppliers, 
transactions or assets, operations or outputs, and total number of natural persons; the fifth 
covers measures that restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture; and the 
sixth identifies limitations on the participation of foreign capital.
53 Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note.
MTN.GNS/W/164 3 September 1993, at [24]. See also the 2001 Guidelines Schedules,
above n 29, at [42].
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limitation described.54 According to the relationship between market access 
and national treatment, the discriminatory measures listed in the market access 
column also apply to national treatment. When the discriminatory measures in 
market access are eliminated within five years after accession, restrictions and 
limitations shall also be eliminated from the national treatment column. China 
has therefore undertaken a full national treatment for the commercial presence 
supply of the service at issue since December 2006.
The Schedule uses the term ‘foreign financial institution’ instead of explicitly 
naming foreign bank branches or exemplifying the scope of foreign financial 
institution. Other Members interpreted this to mean that China was committed 
to eliminating national treatment and market access limitations for financial 
institutions providing banking services, regardless of whether these 
institutions operated as branches or subsidiaries.55 However, China appears to 
treat branches of foreign banks as legal entities separate from foreign financial 
institutions, as it applies more restrictive requirements to foreign bank 
branches than to subsidiaries. In this sense, it is necessary to decide whether 
foreign financial institutions are entitled to include branches of foreign banks.
Article 2 of the Regulations on Administration of Foreign-funded Financial 
Institutions56 (the valid law defining foreign financial institutions before and at 
the time of China’s WTO accession) defines foreign financial institutions by 
listing five types of institution that have been approved to be established to 
operate within the territory of China, including branches of foreign banks. 
Overall, China has committed to provide full national treatment to branches of 
foreign banks.
2 Whether China Has Fulfilled Commitments
To assess whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with China’s national 
treatment commitments under Article XVII of the GATS, it is necessary to 
determine (a) whether services at issue are inscribed in the Schedule; (b) 
whether the measures at issue affect the supply of these services; (c) the extent 
of China’s national treatment commitment, including any conditions or 
qualifications, with respect to these services entered in its schedule; and (d) 
whether these measures accord less favourable treatment to service suppliers 
of other Members than to like domestic suppliers.57
With respect to (a), it has already been established that the services at issue are 
indeed within the scope of banking services inscribed in the Schedule, and are 
therefore subject to any national treatment commitment that China may have 
                                                                 
54 Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunication Services Report of the Panel WT/DS204/R, 
2 April 2004, at [7.75].
55 Committee on Trade in Financial Services, Communication from the United States, Restricted 
S/FIN/W/68, 27 November 2008.
56ཆ䍴䠁㶽ᵪᶴ㇑⨶ᶑֻ, promulgated according to the Order of the State Council No. 148 
on 25 February 1994, was invalided by the Order of the State Council No. 340 and came into 
force on 1 February 2002; was invalided by the Regulation of the Administration of Foreign-
funded Banks on 11 December 2006.
57 Report of the Panel, China—Publications and Audio-visual Products, above n 28, at [7.1272].
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indicated. With respect to (b), as the measure at issue directly governs the 
suppliers (branches of foreign banks) of the services at issue, this affects the 
supply of retail lending from foreign bank branches as questioned by other 
WTO Members under the TRM and TPR, and China has not argued otherwise. 
With respect to (c), China has committed to introduce or maintain limitations 
on national treatment for local currency business listed in the market access 
column. China committed to full national treatment for the services at issue as 
discussed above, because geographic restrictions and client limitations on 
local currency business in market access were eliminated within five years 
after the accession and China has inscribed ‘otherwise, none’.
And finally, with respect to (d), while branches of foreign banks can only take 
RMB deposits from Chinese citizens of more than 1 million RMB, branches of 
non-foreign banks (including Chinese banks, wholly foreign-owned banks and 
joint venture banks established in the territory of China) can accept deposits of 
any size from Chinese citizens. This difference in treatment is based 
exclusively on the national origin of the service supplier; domestic and foreign 
suppliers under the measure at issue are like suppliers, as they are all branches 
of banks. Moreover, branches of foreign banks are prevented from accepting 
individual deposits of more than 1 million RMB from Chinese citizens, 
whereas domestic like service suppliers (branches of non-foreign banks) are 
permitted to do so. The measure at issue thus imposes a discriminatory 
prohibition on foreign service suppliers, which clearly modifies conditions of 
competition in favour of domestic suppliers. Thus, the measure at issue 
accords to foreign service suppliers’ treatment that is less favourable than that 
accorded to domestic like suppliers. Overall, in the author’s view, Article 31 
of the Regulation, stating that branches of foreign banks in China may only 
accept retail deposits from Chinese citizens in excess of 1 million RMB, is in 
violation of Article XVII of the GATS.
B Prudential Measures
China has responded that relevant requirements for foreign-funded bank 
branches conducting local currency business were of a prudential nature and 
that Members were allowed to protect depositors’ interests and maintain the 
soundness and stability of domestic financial systems by introducing 
prudential measures.58 However, it is difficult to identify which measures are 
prudential and which are not, because of the lack of a definition on prudential 
measures or a clear distinction between prudential and non-prudential 
measures.
1 The Prudential Carve-out
In the WTO system, paragraph 2(a) of the Annex of the GATS only provides 
reasons for prudential measures by stating that:
                                                                 
58 China’s Response 2006, S/FIN/M/53, above n 9, at [26]; Trade Policy Review Body 21 and 
23 May 2008, above n 24, 255. 
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Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall 
not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including 
for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure 
the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do 
not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used 
as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under 
the Agreement.
This regulation is known as the ‘prudential carve-out’, but it does not define 
prudential measures and the reasons provided are only illustrative.59 It only 
provides a non-exhaustive list of prudential reasons to justify the adoption of 
domestic measures that may go against a Member’s WTO obligations. 
Moreover, the Annex does not mention that any international standards or the 
role of international organisations may be referred to in order to determine 
prudential measures.
Apart from the prudential carve-out in the Annex, China also argued that 
according to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
banking sector regulators of all countries were entitled to stipulate and utilise 
prudential regulations to control risks to prevent banks from reckless risk-
taking, as long as these regulations were intended to protect the depositors’ 
interests, mitigate banking risks and ensure the safe and sound operation of the 
banking system.60 The BCBS ‘is the primary global standard-setter for the 
prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on 
banking supervisory matters’.61 Seeking to identify measures that could be 
characterised as prudential, the BCBS set forth principles relating to prudential 
regulations and requirements in the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (September 2012 edition).
The principles include typical prudential measures such as the requirement for 
capital adequacy ratio, asset risk concentration and affiliate transactions. 
However, the BCBS documents have no legal force, and are developed and 
issued by the agreement of Members with an expectation that individual 
national authorities will implement them. 62 For example, the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority implemented the Basel III in Australia 
through revisions to its Prudential Standard APS 112 Capital Adequacy: 
Standardized Approach to Credit Risk, which took effect on 1 January 2013.
To clarify the difference between prudential and non-prudential measures, 
some scholars 63 suggest analysing whether the real purpose of an alleged 
                                                                 
59 Régis Bismuth, ‘Financial Sector Regulation and Financial Services Liberalisation at the 
Crossroads: The Relevance of International Financial Standards in WTO Law’ (2010) 44:2 
Journal of World Trade 489, 496; Also see, Éric H Leroux, ‘Trade in Financial Services under 
the World Trade Organisation’ (2002) 36:3 Journal of World Trade 413.
60 Report of the Meeting Held on 27 November 2006, above n 58, at [26].
61 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Charter, Bank for International Settlements 
2013, I.1. 
62 History of Basel Committee, Bank for International Settlement, updated 1 October 2015, 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm>.
63 Sydney J Key, The Doha Round and Financial Services (American Enterprises Institute, 
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prudential measure is trade restrictive or prudential. The second sentence of 
2(a) under the Annex appears to imply that the purpose of defining prudential 
measures is that they shall not be used as a means of avoiding a Member’s 
commitments or obligations under the agreement. The WTO Secretariat also 
states that ‘Article VI:4 and 5 may not be applicable to prudential measures; 
questions may remain as to whether they are based on objective and 
transparent criteria, or are not more burdensome than necessary’.64
Although the objective of avoiding a Member’s GATS obligations is difficult 
to clarify because of the absence of evidence of willingness, the situation has 
improved following rulings in the recent dispute Argentina—Measures 
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (hereinafter Argentina–Financial 
Services), 65 which was the first official WTO decision to address the 
prudential carve-out. The panel in Argentina–Financial Services found that 
two measures setting requirements relating to reinsurance services and for 
access to the Argentina capital market are not justified under paragraph 2(a) of 
the Annex, because they were not taken for prudential reasons in the absence 
of a rational relationship of cause and effect between the measures and the 
prudential reasons.66
Before analysing the requirements that constitute the legal standard under 
paragraph 2(a), the panel defined that ‘it constitutes a justification for 
measures that are inconsistent with the GATS and is therefore in the nature of 
an exception’. 67 The panel also considered that ‘paragraph 2(a) covers all 
types of measures affecting the supply of financial services and not only those 
measures that could be characterised as ‘domestic regulations’ within the 
meaning of Article VI of the GATS’,68 which was confirmed by the Appellate 
Body. The panel then set forth three requirements for examining whether 
measures at issue could be shielded under the prudential exceptions: that 
measures (1) are ‘affecting the supply of financial services’; (2) were taken 
‘for prudential reasons’; (3) have not been used ‘as a means of avoiding 
commitments or obligations’ under the GATS.69
Proceeding to examine ‘for prudential reasons’, the panel analysed the 
meaning of the concept ‘prudential reason’ and then examined what was 
                                                                                                                                                   
Washington DC, 2003) 29; Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, ‘GATS Prudential Carve Out in Financial 
Services and Its Relation with Prudential Regulation’ (2008) 57 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 613, 640; Joel P Trachtman, ‘Addressing Regulatory Divergence 
through International Standards: Financial Services’ in Aaditya Mattoo and Pierre Sauvé (eds.)
Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalisation (World Bank/Oxford University Press, 
Washington DC, 2003) 27, 30; and Régis Bismuth, above n 59, 495.
64 Council for Trade in Services, Financial Services, Background Note by the Secretariat 
S/C/W/72, 2 December 1998, at [35].
65 Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services DS453, hereinafter 
Argentina—Financial Services, complainant Panama, Respondent Argentina, request for 
consultation on 12 December 2012, Panel report 30 September 2015, Appellate Body report 
14 April 2016. 
66 Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS453/R 30 September 2015, at [7.919].
67 Ibid at [7.814].
68 Ibid at [7.847].
69 Ibid at [7.851].
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meant by a measure having been taken for prudential reasons. The panel 
concluded that the expression ‘prudential reasons’ referred to ‘those “causes” 
or “reasons” that motivate financial sector regulators to act to present a risk, 
injury or danger that does not necessarily have to be imminent’, and the list of 
reasons in paragraph 2(a) should be regarded as indicative but not 
exhaustive.70 The Member who is taking the measure has the burden of proof 
to demonstrate whether the measure’s design, structure or architecture seek to 
justify under paragraph 2(a) and the prudential reason provided, which can 
only be determined on a case-by-case basis taking account of the particular 
characteristics of each situation.71
The central aspect of a rational relationship of cause and effect between the 
measure and prudential reasons is the adequacy of the measure with respect to 
the prudential reasons; that is, whether the measure contributes to achieving 
the desired effect.72 With regard to the third requirement, the panel considered 
it unnecessary to continue the examination because Argentina had failed to 
demonstrate that measures were taken for prudential reasons within the 
meaning of paragraph 2(a).73
Figure B: Legal Standard of Prudential Carve-out
2 Assessing Measures at Issue
Based on the panel’s analysis in Argentina–Financial Services, this study
examines whether the 1 million RMB limit in relation to foreign bank 
branches is a prudential measure under paragraph 2(a) of the Annex. The first 
requirement that China has to meet is that the measure at issue is one affecting 
the supply of financial services in accordance with paragraph 1(a) of the 
                                                                 
70 Ibid at [7.868] and [7.879].
71 Ibid at [7.891].
72 Ibid at [7.905].
73 Ibid at [7.945].
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Annex.74 The measure at issue is about providing services through foreign 
bank branches, which refers to Mode 3—the commercial presence of Article 
I:2. Moreover, acceptance of deposits is specifically listed under the 
definitions of financial services in paragraph 5(a) of the Annex, and all 
services subsequently listed in paragraph 5(a) are services of a financial 
nature. Consequently, the measure requiring that foreign bank branches accept 
a minimum of 1 million RMB in any deposit by a Chinese citizen is a measure 
affecting the supply of financial services within the meaning of paragraph 1(a) 
of the Annex.
This study proceeds to examine whether China has also demonstrated that the 
measure at issue is a measure taken for prudential reasons. China maintained 
that the prudential purpose of the measure was to protect the depositors of 
foreign bank branches because the Chinese government was unable to 
supervise and control the risk arising from the parent bank of a foreign branch. 
In terms of the order of debt repayment, many Members prescribe that 
domestic depositors enjoy priority over overseas depositors, so that if the 
parent bank encounters liquidity risk or payment crisis, depositors at the 
branch in China may not be guaranteed priority in repayment. 75 Also, 
international coordination of bankruptcy liquidation has proved to be a tough 
process.76 Many foreign banks in China are multinationals, and the Chinese 
government is unable to supervise and control the risk arising from the parent 
bank of a foreign branch, and is also unable to isolate that risk from its branch 
in China.77 The above reasons identified by China for protecting depositors of 
foreign bank branches and controlling the risk arising from the parent bank 
seem to be prudential in nature and in conformity with the expression of 
prudential reasons in paragraph 2(a) of the Annex.
Finally, it remains to determine whether there is a rational relationship of 
cause and effect between the measure and these prudential reasons. In the 
same regulation as the concerned measure, the conditions under which China 
is considered to protect depositors of foreign bank branches and strengthen the 
supervision and control have already been laid down. Article 8 of the 
Regulation states that a wholly foreign-owned bank or a Chinese–foreign joint 
venture bank should allocate at least 200 million RMB or a freely convertible 
currency of the equivalent value to each of its branches as operating capital. 
This large amount of operating capital can be regarded as a guarantee for 
depositors from China. To cope with liquidity risk or a payment crisis, Article 
44 requires 30% of operating capital to be interest-bearing assets allocated by 
the banking supervisory institution of the State Council, and Article 46 
prescribes the minimum ratio of current assets and current liabilities as 25%.
Moreover, Article 9 regulates that a foreign bank that plans to establish a 
branch or representative office must meet the following requirements: it must 
(1) have the capability to make profits continuously and retain a good credit 
                                                                 
74 See, paragraph 1(a) of the Annex: Reference to the supply of a financial service in this Annex 
shall mean the supply of a service as defined in paragraph 2 of Article I of the Agreement.
75 Report of the Meeting Held on 27 November 2006, above n 58, 26.
76 Trade Policy Review China Minutes of Meeting Addendum 2008, above n 49, at 255.
77 China’s Response 2007, S/FIN/M/55, above n 10, at [50].
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standing and have no record of gross violation of any law or regulation; (2) 
have international financial experience; (3) have an effective anti-money 
laundering system; (4) be under the effective supervision of the financial 
regulatory authority of the country or region in which it is located, and its 
application to establish a branch must have been approved by the financial 
regulatory authority; (5) meet other prudent conditions and have a perfect 
financial regulatory system; its financial regulatory authority must have a good 
mechanism for cooperation with the banking regulatory institution of the State 
Council. To establish a branch, a foreign bank must not only meet the 
requirements as described in Article 9, but also satisfy the requirements stated 
in Article 12: (1) its total assets must not be any less than 20 billion USD at 
the end of the year prior to the filing of its establishment application; and (2) 
its capital adequacy ratio must meet the requirements of the financial 
regulatory authority and the banking regulatory institution of the State 
Council.
The above requirements allow the financial regulatory institution to effectively 
supervise and control the risk arising from the parent bank of a foreign bank 
branch. Articles in the Regulation already performed functions like those 
China claimed to achieve through the measure at issue. These articles can act 
to present a risk, injury or danger that does not necessarily have to be
imminent, without limiting the business scope of foreign service suppliers. In 
doing so, the Chinese supervisory agency would be able to safeguard 
depositors’ interests as well as maintain the supervision and control of risk.
Further, the measure at issue does not directly impose specific requirements on 
preventing liquidity risk or a payment crisis and strengthening of the 
supervision of the parent foreign banks. The prudential reasons claimed by 
China are a side effect of the measure at issue, but the direct effect of applying 
the measure is to establish boundaries for foreign bank branches and then 
persuade foreign banks to establish local subsidiaries in China according to 
Chinese law and regulations. Under the TRM, China responded to other 
Members’ concerns regarding China encouraging foreign banks to establish 
local subsidiary entities to transform existing branches into subsidiaries, 
because a locally incorporated subsidiary of a foreign bank would be subject 
to supervisory requirements with respect to capital adequacy, loan loss 
provisions, large exposures, cross-border capital flows and deposit repayment 
capacity.78 It appears that the effect of the so-called prudential reason is to 
transform branches into local subsidiaries.
It is rational that prudential objectives can be directly achieved without any 
limitations on foreign services and service suppliers, but it is irrational to 
apply a measure having only an indirect effect to achieve a certain prudential 
objective when the objective can be satisfied by other measures. As the 
measure in question is not taken for prudential reasons, it is unnecessary to 
continue the examination on whether the measure has been used as a means of 
avoiding commitments or obligations under the GATS.
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In light of the foregoing discussion, the measure at issue does not have a 
rational cause and effect relationship with the prudential reasons identified by 
China. China also claimed the 20% shareholding limitations on single foreign 
investment institution in Chinese-funded banks as a prudential carve-out. 
Similar to the 1 million RMB requirements, this measure affects the supply of 
financial services, but it was not designed for prudential reasons and thus does 
not contribute to achieving the desired effect of prudential causes.
IV TRANSPARENCY
Since China’s WTO accession, other WTO Members have recognised that 
China has made notable improvements in transparency, ‘particularly through 
the many notifications that it has made to the WTO’s councils and committees
as well as through its use of numerous official journals, other publications and 
the Internet to publicize new or modified trade-related laws, regulations and 
other measures’.79 Nevertheless, they also concede that there remains much to 
be done to ensure transparency obligations committed in the Accession 
Protocol and the Working Party Report. Under the TRM and TPR systems, 
Members have expressed concerns about transparency since 2002, 
immediately after China’s accession.
With regard to transparency in financial services, Members’ concerns under 
the TRM can be categorised as one general expectation, two main themes and 
three follow-up issues. For the general expectation, from the 2006 to the 2011 
TRM Japan consistently held the view that there was room for further 
improvement on regulatory transparency in China. The two main themes of 
transparency are the publication of laws, regulations and policies relating to 
trade and the public comment/consultation procedures on draft laws, 
regulations and other measures, which have been questioned by Canada 
(2004),80 the United States (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009)81 and the European 
Communities (2011).82 Specifically, Canada requested procedures or laws to 
promote a standardised public consultation process; the European 
Communities considered there still appeared to be inconsistencies with regard 
to the publication and provision of adequate opportunities for interested parties 
to comment; the United States indicated that trade-related measures issued by 
other ministries and agencies were not published in China’s nominated official 
journal (the Ministry of Commerce’s MOFCOM Gazette) and that some 
proposed measures only allow periods as brief as 7 or 14 days (rather than 30 
days) for comment.
In addition, Members are concerned about three issues relating to 
transparency: vague provisions, with unspecified criteria, referring to 
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unspecified laws and regulations regarding foreign-funded insurance 
companies (European Communities 2002); insufficient notice on revision of 
regulations and reporting requirements imposing undue costs and burdens 
(Canada 2005 and 2006); and transparency in licensing requirements and 
procedures. Further, WTO Members consistently query transparency under the 
TPR system, but these concerns relate to transparency as a general policy for 
all trade.
The China—Financial Information was caused by the state censorship on 
media, in which the government exerts strict censorship and control over the 
media through the Xinhua News Agency. China–Publications and Audiovisual 
Products also referred to limitations on media products such as reading 
materials, sound recordings, films for theatre release and other publications 
and audiovisual products in electronic and physical forms. These two disputes 
seem likely to be related to China’s deficiencies in transparency, but the 
transparency obligations under the WTO are narrower than in the transparency
discussed in daily life. Hence, this research first clarifies China’s transparency 
obligations before assessing GATS-consistency.
A Transparency in the GATS and China’s WTO 
Commitments
Transparency is a very important element in ensuring competitive markets and 
also a cornerstone of the multilateral trading system. 83 It may facilitate 
international trade by providing a predictable regulatory system; the less 
transparent the regulatory environment, the more likely that anti-competitive 
markets will remain.84 The GATS recognises the importance of transparency 
in its Preamble and in Articles III and VI.
Paragraph 2 of the Preamble stipulates one of the GATS objectives as 
‘wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade 
in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalisation and as a means of promoting the 
economic growth of all trading partners and the development of developing 
countries’. 85 The transparency principle under Article III requires each 
Member to publish all relevant legislation and international agreements 
affecting trade in services by the time they come into force at the latest, and to 
respond to all requests for specific information on any measures affecting 
trade in services. Accordingly, transparency encompasses the publication of 
laws and regulations, procedural fairness in decision-making, judicial review 
and the non-discrimination principle.86 In addition, transparency is a criterion 
for good governance in administration and implementation, such as the 
                                                                 
83 The Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured Nation and 
Transparency, Background Note by the Secretariat WT/WGTCP/W114, 14 April 1999. 
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process of decision-making by governments and the process by which 
decisions are implemented.87 The obligation under Article VI:4 provides not 
only the negotiating framework but also the basic principles that Members 
should transform into domestic disciplines.88 It also calls upon Members to 
develop domestic disciplines based on the principles of necessity, transparency 
and equivalence.
In addition to Article III, it has been specified in the Accession Protocol that 
China shall publish all WTO-related laws, regulations and other measures; 
make drafts of all such documents available for comment for a reasonable time 
prior to enforcement; establish or designate an official journal to publish on a 
regular basis all these measures; and establish a joint enquiry to reply to 
requests for information relating to these measures within a certain number of 
days.89 In the Working Party Report, the representative of China confirmed 
that China would make available to WTO Members translations into one or 
more of the official WTO languages (English, French and Spanish) of all 
relevant laws, regulations and other measures, in no case later than 90 days 
after the enforcement;90 China would also publish a list of all organisations 
responsible for authorising, approving or regulating services activities through 
granting of licences or other approval, as well as the procedures and 
conditions for obtaining such licences or approval.91
B Problems of Transparency
Prior to China’s WTO accession, some Members were concerned about the 
lack of transparency and the difficulty in locating and obtaining WTO-related 
legislation; 92 some even identified a lack of transparency as China’s main 
problem.93 After more than 10 years of trying, the Chinese government has 
made noticeable progress on transparency. Foreign investment and trade-
related laws and regulations have been published in an official gazette since 
1993 and the Chinese government lists seven official journals that contain 
WTO-related information.94 In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation established three entities: the Department of WTO 
Affairs, the China WTO Notification and Enquiry Centre, and the Fair Trade 
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Bureau for Import and Export. 95 In 2006, China adopted a single official 
journal, the MOFCOM Gazette, administered by the Ministry of Commerce 
for the publication of all trade-related laws, regulations and other measures. In 
2008, the Provision on the Disclosure of Government Information 96 was 
promulgated to establish the processes for information disclosure.97 Currently, 
the Department of WTO Affairs and the China WTO Notification and Enquiry 
Centre operate within the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry of Commerce 
has established a website98 to disseminate information and has also organised 
a China/WTO website for WTO/Free Trade Agreement (FTA) consulting.99
However, other WTO Members’ concerns reveal problems with China’s 
implementation of its transparency obligations, including publication and 
consultation. In 2015, the US–China Business Council indicated that 
transparency was consistently cited as a top concern in the annual survey on 
China’s business environment, including the openness of government decision 
making, the public availability of information, and the solicitation of broad 
public feedback during the drafting of new laws and regulations.100 In general, 
China’s deficiencies in its transparency obligations comprise ‘obligations 
concerning the publication and notification of relevant measures and 
obligations concerning the administration and application of measures’.101
1 Transparency on Publication and Consultation
During the negotiation of China’s WTO accession, ‘some Members noted the 
difficulty in finding and obtaining copies of regulations and other measures 
undertaken by various ministries’ and they also suggested using ‘the Internet 
and other means to ensure that information … at all levels could be assembled 
in one place and made readily available’.102 Until now, neither a single official 
journal nor a website has published legal information from all legislatives at 
the central level. The MOFCOM Gazette publishes most government entities’ 
trade-related measures, but publication is less common for measures such as 
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opinions, circulars, orders, directives and notices. 103 The large quantity of 
these departmental rules, issued by more than 60 departments and agencies of 
the State Council, increases the difficulty of publication and public 
accessibility to all.104 In 2014, only 75% of regulatory documents were posted 
by the State Council, even though the rate of published regulations has 
increased 50 percentage points from 2013 and 2014.105
The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the 
Legislative Law) and its relevant regulations 106 require that drafts of 
regulations, rules and local decrees be made available to the public and the 
opinions of relevant authorities, other organisations and citizens be collected, 
but ‘many of China’s ministries have not been consistent in publishing draft 
departmental rules for public comment’.107 In the 2012 Trade Policy Review 
Report, the Secretariat said, ‘it would appear that not all departmental rules 
have been published for public comment’.108 From January to December 2013, 
the State Council posted less than 10% of its own administrative regulations 
and department rules for public comment through the State Council 
Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO); other government agencies did no better 
and only a small fraction of relevant documents were posted for comment on 
either the SCLAO (less than 10%) or their respective agency websites (less 
than 17%).109 During 2014, just three of nine laws passed or amended by the 
National People’s Council were posted for public comment.110
At the sub-national level, no official journal publishes local decrees and rules, 
and administrative practice involves the use of informal and unpublished 
regulatory documents. 111 According to Article I of the GATS, measures 
affecting trade in services include measures issued by regional or local 
governments and authorities. According to the Legislative Law, the local 
people’s congress of a province, autonomous region, municipality or major 
city has the right to make local decrees or rules. The numerous local decrees 
and rules are not published in official journals and websites at the central 
level, and some of them may not be published on local governments’ websites. 
Although the Legislation Law states that local decrees and rules must be 
published in the bulletin and newspaper,112 local decrees only sporadically 
appear on the websites of local governments. It is difficult to locate local 
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decrees and rules relating to the services trade, and virtually impossible for 
anyone to know exactly which rules apply.113 For example, the website of the 
China Legislative Information Network System114 mainly publishes the central 
government’s trade-related legislation and the website ‘China Trade in 
Services’ 115 publishes laws, regulations and departmental rules relating to 
trade in services; however, most local decrees and draft measures for comment 
are not published on websites. Moreover, legislative and administrative action 
at the local level still operates with limited supervision from the central 
government, which creates virtually no transparency. 116 Administrative 
interference and improper administrative action persist and is usually used to 
achieve local protectionism and revenue policy.
At both the central and local levels, most legislation is only published in 
Chinese. This may compromise China’s transparency obligations under the 
Working Party Report in which China promised to make available all 
measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods or services, intellectual 
property, or foreign exchange control in one or more of the official WTO 
languages no more than 90 days following implementation.117 Although the 
English editions of laws and some regulations can be found, most newly 
published regulations and local rules relating to trade in services are published 
only in Chinese. As the legislation adopts professional and technical 
terminology in Chinese characters, it is difficult for foreign services suppliers 
to understand them well. Chinese lawyers can undertake bilingual consulting 
for foreign investors, but this may increase cost and ambiguity because 
different lawyers may have different understandings. Further, a lawyer’s 
translation can only be used as a reference; it has no legal effect. Even though 
it is important to make translations of legislation available to WTO Members 
before measures are implemented or enforced, China has not yet established 
the infrastructure to produce translations of trade-related measures.118
Regarding the reasonable period for comments before implementing measures, 
Article 37 of the Legislative Law legalised a 30-day public comment period, 
but only for bills on the agenda of the session of the Standing Committee. For 
other laws, regulations and measures promulgated by other legislative bodies, 
the 30-day reasonable period is just a soft law: the Interim Measures on 
Solicitation of Public Comments on Draft Law and Regulations states that 
draft regulations would generally be released for public comment for no less 
than 30 days.119
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In 2008, 2011 and 2012, the State Council of China pledged during bilateral 
dialogues with the United States to release drafts of all economic and trade-
related administrative regulations and departmental rules for at least a 30-day 
public comment period. 120 During 2014, only 37.3% of broad regulatory 
documents posted to other government agencies’ websites were posted for at 
least 30 days, and these documents had an average comment period of fewer 
than 20 days. 121 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) made comments regarding China that public 
participation in policy formulation was ‘informing the public rather than 
collecting opinions for improving policy making’.122
2 Transparency on Administration and Implementation
The requirements of transparency, due process and efficiency for the 
implementation of domestic regulations are regulated as the procedural rules 
under Articles VI:2 and 3 of the GATS. Transparency under Article VI is not 
about publication and comments to measures affecting trade in services under 
Article III, but is about objective and impartial procedures for administrative 
decisions and the provision of information at the request of an affected service 
supplier. Article VI also requires administration relating to trade in services to 
be in accordance with due process and efficiency standards. Due process ‘calls 
for procedural justice in the national jurisdiction of all Members, and thus 
creates a procedurally levelled playing field with respect to domestic 
administrative law provisions tracking trade in services’.123
The efficiency standards require authorities to complete the consideration and 
to inform the applicant within a reasonable period of time. In the Working 
Party Report, China also committed that it would publish a list of all 
organisations granting licence or other approval, procedures and the conditions 
for obtaining such licences or approval. Transparency under Article VI 
permits markets to function effectively and reduces the opportunity for 
officials to engage in trade-distorting practices behind closed doors.124
Other WTO Members also expressed concerns about transparency in 
licensing, approval requirements, procedures and timelines under the TRM 
and TPR. The 2014 Trade Policy Review Report on China also indicated that 
‘many aspects of China’s trade and investment policy regime remain complex 
and opaque, leaving scope for administrative discretion and corruption’. 125
Specifically, problems of transparency in administration manifest in three 
ways: unpublished internal notices; reference to unspecified laws and 
regulations; and lack of efficiency caused by vague procedures.
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The Legislative Law stipulates that ministries, commissions, the PBC, auditing 
agencies and a body directly under the State Council have the right to enact 
administrative rules within the scope of their authority, to regulate matters that 
concern implementing laws and administrative regulations. 126 It also 
authorises the government of a province, autonomous region, municipality or 
major city to enact local rules to implement laws, administrative regulations or 
local decrees.127 For these legislative bodies, lack of transparency resulting 
from unpublished internal notices is not a new issue; it has been discussed by 
scholars since China’s WTO accession.128 Internal notices are known as the 
normative documents that have the general binding force of legislation. They 
are adopted extensively by administrative bodies, especially at the local level, 
and encompass many forms, such as decisions, notices and provisions.129 As 
normative documents are not publicly available, they make governments’ 
decisions impossible to comprehend, especially in the administration of 
licensing or approval.130 However, the publication requirements outlined in the 
Legislation Law do not apply to normative documents, as they are not 
regulated in the Legislation Law or other relevant laws.131
China’s laws and regulations regarding licensing or approval requirements 
commonly apply ‘and other relevant regulations’ as the supplementary 
requirements at the end of articles. This creates loopholes enabling the 
Chinese government to enact unknown requirements for administrative 
decisions. In the Regulation, eight articles (Articles 9, 14, 17, 20, 27, 29, 31 
and 34) refer to unspecified laws and regulations. For example, regarding the 
requirements of a shareholder planning to establish a foreign-funded bank, 
Article 9 lists four detailed requirements along with a fifth item stating other 
prudent conditions as prescribed by the banking regulatory institution of the 
State Council.
With regard to due process and efficiency, concerns remain in lengthy 
approval procedures and ambiguity in the application processes. In the Rules 
for Implementation, the timeline for the CBRC to decide has been stipulated 
in some licensing applications but not all. For example, to establish a branch 
by a wholly foreign-owned bank or joint venture bank, Article 15 of the Rules 
for Implementation only requires the banking regulatory bureau of the location 
                                                                 
126 Article 71, Legislative Law.
127 Article 73, Legislative Law.
128 Sarah Biddulph, ‘Through A Glass Darkly: China, Transparency and the WTO’ (2001) 3:1 
Australia Journal of Asian Law 59; Ljiljana Biukovic, ‘Selective Adaptation of WTO 
Transparency Norms and Local Practices in China and Japan’ (2008) 11:4 Journal of 
International Economic law 803; Paolo Davide Farah, ‘Five Years of China WTO 
Membership: EU and US Perspectives about China’s Compliance with Transparency 
Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism’ (2006) 33:3 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 263; Hubert Bazin, ‘Transparency and National Treatment under the 
Chinese Flag: A Lawyer’s View of the Decade of WTO Membership and Legal Reforms’ 
(2012) 1 China Perspectives 79; Thomas E Volper, ‘TRIPS Enforcement in China: A Case 
For Judicial Transparency’ (2007) 33:1 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 309.   
129 Sijie Chen, above n 93, 44.
130 Tobias Bender, ‘How to Cope with China’s (Alleged) Failure to Implement the TRIPS 
Obligations on Enforcement’ 9:2 (2006) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 230, 235; 
also see, Sijie Chen, above n 104, 44. 
131 Ibid 46.
2017 CHINA’S FINANCIAL REGULATIONS … 169
 
where the branch to be established to submit its examination opinions to the 
CBRC within 20 days, but does not regulate how long it will take for the 
CBRC to decide. The lack of timeline for establishing a branch reflects 
China’s standpoint of encouraging the establishment of locally incorporated 
subsidiaries of foreign banks instead of branches, which reverberates the issue 
of the 1 million RMB minimum deposit requirement from Chinese citizens as 
discussed above.
In general, regulatory transparency is an important step to help China achieve 
its economic and trade goals of being a major global economy and playing a 
leading role in setting global trade policy. Lack of transparency may destroy 
the chances of creating a predictable policy environment and the confidence of 
global investors, thereby negatively affecting China’s ability to achieve its 
goals.
V CONCLUSIONS
To identify potential inconsistencies, this paper reviewed all issues related to 
China’s financial services under the TRM and TPR. The review of questions 
under the TRM and TPR reveals several ever-present concerns of other 
Members, including the 25% share limitation on multiple foreign financial 
institutions in a Chinese financial institution; the 20% share limitation on a 
single foreign financial institution in a Chinese financial institution; the 1 
million RMB limitation on foreign banks’ local currency business; and the 
lack of transparency in publication, consultation, administration and 
implementation. To examine the GATS-consistency of these questions, this 
research applied the general rules of treaty interpretation to relevant terms; 
assessed the domestic measures being challenged; interpreted the GATS 
provisions for market access, national treatment and domestic regulation; and 
examined the facts behind the concerns raised through the application of legal 
standards. Moreover, the preliminary analysis, selective method, comparative 
method and hermeneutic, explanatory, deduction and analogy approaches were 
employed to achieve the research purpose. As a result, this paper finds that the 
25% cap on shareholding by multiple foreign financial institutions is not a 
violation of China’s commitment to eliminate restrictions on ownership.
However, other concerns are inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations. The 
20% cap on shareholding in a Chinese-funded bank by a single foreign 
financial institution represents a limitation on foreign equity participation in 
terms of regulating the maximum percentage limit to foreign shareholding 
under Article XVI:2(f) of the GATS and is contrary to China’s commitments 
in its Schedule. The 1 million RMB minimum for foreign banks’ local 
currency business is in violation of Article XVII of the GATS because the 
measure imposes a discriminatory prohibition on foreign service suppliers, 
clearly modifies conditions of competition in favour of domestic suppliers, 
and accords to foreign service suppliers treatment less favourable than that 
accorded to like domestic suppliers. Regarding these limitations, China has 
claimed that the relevant requirements are of a prudential nature. 
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This research recognises that these measures only have an indirect effect on 
achieving a certain prudential objective when the objective can be reached by 
other measures, so that measures at issue do not have a rational relationship of 
cause and effect with the prudential reasons. Further, China still has not 
complied with its transparency obligations under the Accession Protocol and 
Working Party Report in terms of the following: publication is insufficient for 
measures promulgated by departments and local governments; most legislation 
is only published in Chinese and not in other official WTO languages; 
regulatory documents are not posted for consultation for a certain period of 
time; and there is a lack of transparency on licensing and approval 
requirements, procedures and timelines.
China’s compliance with the GATS in financial services is significant not only 
for the Chinese government, but also for other Members who already have or 
want to have close trade relations with China. GATS-inconsistencies may 
impede foreign investment in financial services and impede China’s trade 
relationship with other Members. It may also interfere with opening up the 
service market and thereby hold back overall development. Moreover, GATS-
inconsistencies may lead to WTO disputes against China, with related costs. 
Becoming involved in a dispute may cost considerable time, effort and money. 
There are also opportunity costs in terms of other tasks not carried out. An 
imponderable cost is national reputation, if a WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding finds against a defendant WTO Member.132 More to the point, 
inconsistent measures may lead to the chilling of foreign efforts to supply 
services to China because of the unwarranted expenses or difficulties in doing 
business.
For service suppliers from other WTO Members, this research may provide a 
better understanding of China’s legal situation affecting financial services, 
allowing them to predict the difficulties and extra expense of providing 
services in the territory of China. If service suppliers agree with the identified 
inconsistent measures, they could estimate economic benefits and undertake 
the additional legal research necessary to convince their governments to 
pursue a case.
                                                                 
132 Digby Gascoine, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: Lessons Learned from the Salmon Case’ 
(Conference on International Trade Education and Research, Managing Globalization for 
Prosperity, Melbourne, 26 and 27 October 2005).
